The Unity of Cognition, or, How to Read the Leitfaden (A79) by Schulting, Dennis
Dennis Schulting 
The Unity of Cognition and the Subjectivist vs. “Transformative” Approaches 
to the B-Deduction, or, How to Read the Leitfaden (A79) 
1 Introduction 
In an illuminating essay “Die Einheit des Erkenntnisvermögens bei Kant” (Conant 2017a), 
James Conant critically addresses what he argues is a widespread assumption in modern 
philosophy, namely, the assumption that our rational capacity to know is a capacity that is 
somehow “added” or tacked on to the capacity that we humans share with other animals, 
that is, our receptive capacity for sensations, our sensibility.  This is the so-called “additive” 1
theory of cognition, more speciﬁcally, of the relation between sensibility and the 
understanding.  He addresses this assumption by looking at the main argument of Kant’s 2
Transcendental Deduction. Let me say upfront that I think Conant’s paper is one of the 
very few long-form pieces on the central thrust of the Deduction that I have read from the 
last twenty years or so, if not longer, that are as rhetorically strong as they are, on the 
whole, both interpretatively and philosophically appealing. I believe it is one of those papers 
 A longer English version of Conant’s paper was published in the journal Philosophical Topics under the 1
somewhat generic title “Why Kant is not a Kantian” (it says that it is published in 2016, but to my 
knowledge the article came out only in 2017), and a shorter version appears in the volume Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason: A Critical Guide, edited by James O’Shea (O’Shea 2017) under the more apt title “Kant’s 
Critique of the Layer-Cake Conception of Human Mindedness in the B Deduction” (Conant 2017b). When I 
wrote this chapter, I relied on the German published version, which came out ﬁrst in January 2017 in a 
Suhrkamp volume (see Conant 2017a). Insofar as the German version and the longer English version (2016) 
overlap, in most cases I’ll provide the English quotations from Conant (2016) and the German references 
(from 2017a) after the slash.
 Conant calls it thus in the German version of the article, on which I relied. In the English version, he refers, 2
somewhat confusingly, to both the conjunctivist and disjunctivist conception of the relation between sentience 
and sapience. It is however the latter which is the additive view that he rejects.
that will, or at any rate should, be seen as a standard reference in the same way that Dieter 
Henrich’s inﬂuential article on the “two-step” procedure of the B-Deduction has been – 
Conant indeed also refers to Henrich’s now famous “two-step” proposal, but thinks that his 
own construal avoids what, in Conant’s view, can be seen as the delusive nature of 
Henrich’s overall framework, which suggests that there are indeed two independent, 
separably intelligible “steps in a proof” (Conant 2016:111). 
 I quite agree with the general tenor of Conant’s paper, namely that the Deduction 
should not be read as if the two stems of knowledge, sensibility and understanding, were 
connected in the way suggested by what he aptly calls the “layer-cake conception of human 
mindedness” (2016:78/2017a:232), whereby concepts are somehow “added” or tacked on to 
pre-given manifolds of representations to constitute acts of cognition. This is not to say 
though that I agree with all of the arguments he presents in support of this critical view, or 
even with the main argument he mounts in support of undermining the layer-cake 
conception of human mindedness. I think Conant oversells his rightful critique of the layer-
cake conception by underestimating the modal nature of Kant’s reasoning in the Deduction 
and the compatibility between it and a minimally or relatively nonconceptualist 
interpretation. Conant thinks that a rejection of the layer-cake conception of human 
mindedness entails an unqualiﬁed rejection of nonconceptualism of any sort. By contrast, I 
think there is a third possible route, which likewise rejects the layer-cake conception of 
human mindedness, but is still compatible with a kind of minimal or relative 
nonconceptualism about the relation between sensibility and the understanding, which also 
avoids the problems of Conant’s own positive reading (which I come to in the course of this 
discussion). To put it succinctly, I think Conant’s reading of the Deduction is too strongly 
conceptualist, and unnecessarily so. In this paper, I shall address some of the main points 
on which I diverge from Conant’s reading. Along the way, I present an alternative, novel 
reading of the central claim that Kant advances in the so-called Leitfaden passage in the 
lead up to the Transcendental Deduction, which enables a better understanding of the 
relation between sensibility and the understanding. 
2 The “Additive”/“Disjunctivist” Theory of Cognition and Kant’s Deduction 
In the essay, Conant debunks what he calls the “additive Auﬀassung des Verhältnisses 
zwischen Sinnlichkeit und Vernunft qua kognitiver Vermögen” (2017a:231),  in other words, 3
the view that our rational and sensible capacities are wholly separable capacities when it 
comes to the formation or possibility of knowledge, and the view that, if we abstract from 
the unique and characteristic rational capacity that humans have, humans and other 
animals share the same sensible capacity to perceive their empirical environments and that 
when we make a claim to knowledge, our capacity for knowing “adds” something to our 
sensibility. The general, philosophical thrust of Conant’s story behind this rejection does 
not strike me as particularly controversial, or novel, for that matter (Conant himself points 
to McDowell’s inﬂuence), and it is also intuitively plausible. So I am not going to probe this 
here. Rather, I want to look at Conant’s interpretation of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction 
as a way of shoring up his philosophical critique of the “layer-cake conception of human 
mindedness”, that is, seeing Kant’s Deduction as an argument that debunks the 
“additive”/“disjunctivist” conception of the relation between our cognitive capacities. 
 Though I think Kant’s main aim in the Deduction is indeed to argue for the intimacy 
between the cognitive capacities that only together enable knowledge, I do not think 
Conant’s attempt in enlisting Kant in an eﬀort to refute the “additive” theory of cognition 
is entirely successful; for in trying to present Kant as a critic of the “additive” theory of 
cognition, he ignores an important modal element in Kant’s argument that has to do with 
what elsewhere I have called Kant’s “radically subjectivist” outlook (Schulting 2017a), 
 In the longer English version of the article, Conant talks about “a disjunctivist conception of the relation 3
between sentience and sapience qua cognitive capacities” (2016:79), which he contrasts with his own 
“conjunctivist” conception of that relation.
which involves central aspects of his transcendental idealism, which Conant does not discuss 
(but it is not necessary for my account here to enter that debate). The argument that 
Kant’s argument in the Deduction should not be seen as an “additive” (or “disjunctivist”) 
theory of cognition may be seen as a major obstacle to regarding Kant as a 
nonconceptualist. But I shall argue below that while Kant is indeed not a so-called 
“additive” theorist of cognition, this does not, or at least not on its own, undermine the 
view that Kant is a nonconceptualist insofar as the mere intuition of objects or our mere 
sensible receptivity independently of the understanding is concerned, a view the real 
possibility of which Conant explicitly dismisses. Instead, Conant proposes the 
“transformative” view of cognition, whereby our sensibility is wholly transformed by and in 
virtue of the capacities of our understanding, in other words, by our use of concepts for any 
claim about empirical objects. This uniquely and completely diﬀerentiates us, as rational 
animals with sentient capacities, from non-rational sentient beings. Conant writes the 
following: 
What happens when we move through the Stufenleiter of forms of cognition, from considering the form of 
cognitive capacity involved in nonrational animal cognition to a form that essentially involves the use of 
concepts and the formation of judgments, is that the sort of animal under consideration is one whose 
nature is transformed through and through. A corollary of this Kantian thesis [...] is the following: The 
possibility of something’s being given to the sensory consciousness of a rational animal, if that animal’s 
awareness thereof is to be conceived as an integral moment in the exercise of its overall capacity for 
rational cognition, requires that that capacity for sensory aﬀection radically diﬀer in its internal character 
from that of any nonrational animal. It requires that we come to see how the capacity for sensory aﬀection 
in the rational animal exhibits the marks of the form of its capacity for cognition and thus how the 
episodes of such sensory consciousness are themselves shaped by the manner in which they are, ab initio, 
such as to be apt to bear on rational reﬂection on how things are. (Conant 2016:78f./2017a:232) 
Das Schichtkuchenmodell des menschlichen Geistes zurückzuweisen heißt zu denken, dass die Natur des 
Vermögens zu sinnlichem Bewusstsein im menschlichen Tier kraft der Relation, in der es zur Vernunft 
stehen muss, verändert wird. Sein innerer Charakter qua Vermögen der Sinnlichkeit ist formal von 
demjenigen verschieden, der sich in jedem beliebigen Tier mit einem kognitiven Vermögen ohne vernünftige 
Form ﬁndet. (Conant 2017a:232f.) 
These remarks suggest, ﬁrst, that there is something intrinsic about our human sensibility 
that makes it apt for or amenable to rational reﬂection as if our sensations were 
teleologically intended to be the content of rationally formed perceptions and ultimately 
judgements about how objects aﬀecting our minds are, that is, that sensations have an 
inbuilt capacity for being intentional rational mental content (if so, this would eo ipso 
invalidate any kind of essentialist nonconceptualism). Secondly, notwithstanding Conant’s 
legitimate worry that what he calls the “layer-cake conception” – whereby the sensible and 
rational parts of our cognitive capacities are absolutely separated and the rational part is as 
it were imposed on (added to) a pre-given sensible content – is very problematic, the view 
that, as Conant suggests, humans and other animals have radically diﬀerent kinds of 
sensibility (and that this is indeed Kant’s view) does not strike me as immediately 
persuasive. In what sense are human beings qua sentient beings then still like other 
animals? Conant remarks that 
our sentient cognitive faculty, as we encounter it in act [...] represents a faculty whose form is utterly 
distinct in character from any whose exercise might manifest itself in the sensory life of a nonrational 
animal – even if, when investigated from a merely physiological point of view, that animal’s sensory 
equipment might reveal itself to be in countless respects physiologically indistinguishable from our own. 
(Conant 2016:79/2017a:233, boldface added) 
This does not help much, at least not stated as such, in clarifying the precise diﬀerence 
between human and non-human animal sensibility and why they are diﬀerent unless the 
“formal”/“physiological”  distinction is supposed to play an operative role here. 4
 This distinction comes out better in the German version.4
 I think the problem here lies in the fact that, at least prima facie, Conant looks in 
the wrong direction for the solution to the familiar Kantian problem of how to see our 
sensibility and our rational capacity, the understanding, as linked up. The link between 
sensibility and the understanding has got nothing to do with the question whether, from a 
factual perspective, human beings and animals share or do not share a common sensibility, 
nor with analysing the question of how, in a kind of bottom-up process, our sensibility is 
supposedly geared toward entering into our rational reﬂections or judgements about objects. 
Such an analysis would require probing into the putative natural disposition of our 
sensibility toward rationality – and this seems to go wholly against Kant’s sui generis 
transcendental or Copernican approach to the analysis of knowledge. Neither is it of course 
true, as Conant is right to point out, that these our judgements are somehow imposed upon, 
or “added to”, our sensibility after the fact, along the “layer-cake” model, as if our 
sensibility were something wholly alien to our rationally formed judgements (whatever one 
understands by “imposition”, and we shall have cause to return to this infelicitous 
terminology below). These questions are informed by a much too naturalist, and hence, I 
believe, an in essence rather unkantian understanding of the possibility of knowledge and 
what constitutes it and any accounts thereof. 
 What I believe is instead fundamentally at issue is that, for Kant, the link between 
sensibility and the understanding is one whereby from the subjective perspective of the 
understanding (and thus judgement [A69 / B94]) whatever sensibility delivers to us is taken, 
by us as cognisers or judgers, as necessarily contributing to our knowledge of objects and as 
intimately conjoined with our capacity for the use of concepts in virtue of that capacity, 
under the assumption that (1) there are such objects, and (2) sensibility provides us 
immediate access to them, and (3) we have in fact knowledge of them – such “taking as” is 
to be seen in terms of Kant’s theory of transcendental apperception, and, as said, I have 
elsewhere labelled this reading of Kant’s theory of knowledge “radically subjectivist” (see 
Schulting 2017), whereby the epithet “radical” should be seen as diﬀerentiating the 
subjectivism at issue from psychological construals of subjectivism. There is an implicitly 
modal element involved here, which suggests that sensibility and the understanding are 
necessarily and intimately linked only if from this connection objective cognition or 
knowledge should be seen to arise, that is, in cases of actual cognition. Sensibility and the 
understanding are not connected or conjoined in a modally absolute sense, i.e. simpliciter. 
 This modal constraint on our cognition is often wholly ignored. This, I am inclined 
to believe, is because of an almost universal naturalist bias in readings of Kant’s Deduction 
argument, or of Kant’s philosophy in general. Sensibility does not lead to judgements about 
objects as a matter of course as if it were its natural disposition to do so, and nor is it the 
case that sensibility always leads to judgements about objects. It is not as if the choice were 
between arguing that sensibility and understanding either are or are not, in one way or 
another, always related to each other. Rather, they are related only under a certain 
condition, which means they are not related at all if that condition is not met. My last 
point should not be taken as saying that, necessarily, for every tokening of sensibility there 
is a condition under which it obtains. The conditionality at issue is not an absolutely 
necessary condition on sensibility, as space and time are. Rather, it concerns the subjective 
condition of thought that takes the sensible tokening as necessarily conjoined with itself (i.e. 
with thought itself) such that it yields an objectively valid cognition. This condition, which 
points to the subjectivism I suggested earlier as an alternative reading of the relation 
between sentience and sapience, is a conditionally necessary condition on sensibility, namely 
insofar as sensibility provides the necessary connection of our conceptuality to the world 
and we understand the sensible uptake as of the world. 
*** 
But I’m getting ahead of myself. Let us ﬁrst turn to Conant’s own take on things and focus 
on his “formal”/“physiological” distinction with respect to human sensibility and how the 
formal side of sensibility is intimately linked to the understanding. The “change” or 
“transformation” that sensibility is said to undergo in human cognition, and about which 
Conant speaks in the above-quoted passage, leads him – under the inﬂuence of work by 
Matthew Boyle (which I must admit I’m not familiar with ) – to label his own reading of 5
the Kantian cognitive model the “transformative conception of human mindedness” (Conant 
2016:80/2017a:234), which is not coincidentally also reﬂected by the subtitle of the German 
volume in which Conant’s essay appears (i.e. “Texte zu einer transformativen Theorie der 
menschlichen Subjektivität”). 
3 The Three “Puzzles” in Relation to the Transcendental Deduction 
Conant argues that there are three main puzzles in relation to the topic at hand, and that 
these all hang together. Rather than being concerned with refuting sceptical doubt, Conant 
thinks – and I believe quite rightly – that Kant’s Deduction has got to do with solving 
fundamental puzzles that concern the very possibility of knowledge, and is not about 
“whether we can have this or that bit of knowledge” (2016:83/2017a:237). I thus agree with 
Conant that the Deduction is not about whether we have knowledge under various (non-
transcendental) conditions or indeed whether we are justiﬁed in believing that p about 
objects or about the conditions or warrants for a justiﬁed true belief p, or more radically, 
whether there are even objects out there, but rather about how it is possible in the ﬁrst 
place that we have knowledge in general and can make particular knowledge claims, 
judgements as Kant calls them. The three puzzles at issue in the Deduction, according to 
Conant, are (I paraphrase): 
1. What is the relation of the formal conditions of sensibility, as expounded in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, to the formal conditions of the understanding, as expounded in 
the Transcendental Analytic? 
 Boyle also has an essay in the German volume in which Conant’s piece appears (Boyle 2017).5
2. What is the relation between the A- and B-versions of the Transcendental Deduction? 
3. What is the relation between the ﬁrst and second halves, the so-called “ﬁrst” and 
“second step” (Henrich 1969), of the B-Deduction? 
I think this breakdown is right as far as the ﬁrst and third puzzles go, but I would argue 
that the question of the second puzzle is much less important for an explanation of Kant’s 
main argument in the Deduction, it being more of a philological than an interpretative 
issue; notwithstanding the apparent structural diﬀerences between the A- and B-
Deductions, I think that the thrust of the central argument of the A-Deduction can be read 
along the same lines as the main argument in the B-Deduction (I have done so myself in 
Schulting 2017a, ch. 6), so that a comparative examination of the two versions won’t reveal 
any substantial additional problems with respect to resolving the other two puzzles – it 
appears, further on in his text, that Conant in fact thinks the same. At any rate, I do not 
think that not being able to immediately resolve the second puzzle will have an impact on 
resolving the ﬁrst and third puzzles. The ﬁrst and third questions can thus be answered 
without answering the second. But indeed the ﬁrst and third question hang together: having 
an answer to the ﬁrst puzzle enables one to answer the third. Conant however polemically 
suggests that “most accepted solutions to the ﬁrst puzzle render the second and third 
puzzles insoluble” (2016:81/2017a:235). This makes one certainly curious as to what his own 
proposed solution to the puzzles amounts to. 
4 The Relation Between Sensibility and the Understanding 
Nonconceptualists might be taken to argue that we ﬁrst sensibly apprehend an object in 
order to only then make judgements about it. Assuming that this is their view, this does 
not work, for among many other reasons it invites an explanatory regress as to how 
sensibility and the understanding are a priori connected such that there is a case of 
knowledge properly so called or a claim to knowledge properly so called, as would appear to 
be a requirement on Kant’s account of possible knowledge or cognition.  A post hoc 6
imposition of a judgemental structure upon a pre-given sensible manifold is a posteriori, not 
a priori (even if of course the manifold is given independently). Also, as Conant crucially 
notes, if our ﬁrst cognitive encounter with the world is purely sensible, and does not reﬂect 
in any way the structure of our understanding of the world, which only in the second 
instance “works that raw sensory matter up into something ﬁt to be a candidate for 
entering into a relation of objective purport between how we take the world to be and how 
it is”, then we are left with a “picture in which our forms of understanding always operate 
at an unbridgeable remove from” reality (2016:84/2017a:239). Conant thinks this results in 
the Humean conclusion that “[t]he forms of our understanding – categories such as 
substance and causality – now appear, at best, to involve mere subjective projections onto 
something already given, something to which the unity of thought is 
external” (2016:84/2017a:239). 
 But – and this is the operative question – does refuting this externalist picture of the 
relation of the understanding to sensibility, and hence to the world, necessarily mean that 
sensibility is always already conceptually informed, as Conant suggests? Conant says that 
the empiricist thesis that “[w]hat is given to the senses does not as such exhibit the form of 
thought” (2016:84/2017a:239) is contradicted by Kant. But this, I believe, is not the case 
(cf. B129f., 134). Nonconceptualists are not wrong about the fact that mere intuition is not 
conceptually laden; they are wrong in claiming that sensibility is “self-standingly 
intelligible” (Conant 2016:84/2017a:240) and is a sui generis mode of objective cognition 
 I do not distinguish between the terms “knowledge” and “cognition” as is sometimes standard, for as said 6
above we are dealing here with Kant’s transcendental account of knowledge itself, not merely with how we, as 
epistemic agents, have a capacity for knowledge let alone with actual instances of (empirical) knowledge and 
all kinds of non-transcendental conditions for achieving it, but also with how objects themselves are ﬁrst 
capable of being known. Kant’s account concerns possible knowledge. The suggestion is often that Kant’s 
account does not or cannot deal with the objects of our cognition, but this is just mistaken. See Schulting 
(2018).
properly so called, and they are wrong about how intuitions and the understanding are 
related in cases of genuine, actual cognition, or at least they are negligent in explaining that 
relation. 
 My own “radically subjectivist” (henceforth “subjectivist” for short) reading of the 
relation between sensibility and the understanding has it that sensibility and the 
understanding are intricately related at the fundamental level insofar and only insofar as 
the understanding takes them so. This means that it is certainly really possible for a mere 
sensible manifold of representations not to be conceptually informed, namely for all 
occurrent cases of sensible intuition where the understanding does not actually take up the 
sensible manifold as referring to a certain object in an actual judgement about that object. 
Sensibility does after all not contain, in and of itself, the element of necessary combination 
that is needed for conceptual recognition and thus for empirical knowledge (see the B-
Deduction, §15). As said, there is a modal element involved in our knowledge, that is to say, 
sensibility is conceptually informed by the understanding at the fundamental level if and 
only if I, as judger, take what is receptively given as contributing to the content of my 
judging, that is, judge the content that is given in sensibility to be the intentional content 
that says something about the world. Importantly, this does not at all amount to a 
relativist position about knowledge, nor does it leave a gap between my judging and the 
world, for my judging in any occurrent case of judging involves staking a claim, in virtue of 
the categories of modality and quality respectively, about the very existence and the 
objectivity of the thing about which I judge that so and so. There could not be an issue of a 
remaining gap in principle between my judgement that so and so and things being so and 
so. (I say “in principle”, for my judgement p could of course still be empirically false; this 
concerns the diﬀerence between a judgement’s necessary objective validity, its 
incontrovertible transcendental truth, and its having a truth value.)  7
 The understanding informs sensibility not as a matter of course, as if Kant wanted to 
say to Hume  that “what is the case in cognition is precisely the opposite of what you 8
claim”. Kant does not say that necessary connection can after all be found in sensibility. 
This would be to ignore Kant’s clear statements to the contrary (B130, 134) and to 
misunderstand his relation to Hume. However, the subjectivist reading neither suggests that 
Kant is just a Humean, who believes that true knowledge is merely what we project on to 
the world, but has nothing to do with the world itself, and that we always “operate at an 
unbridgeable remove from” the world. Kant is not in any way acceding to the empiricist, 
who, as Conant puts it, “insists that our cognitive access to the world must, in the ﬁrst 
instance, be purely sensory” and that there is “a self-standing sensory way of knowing what 
is – one which can operate independently of the exercise of a capacity for 
thought” (2016:83/2017a:238). 
 Conant says that the task of the Transcendental Analytic is to show that the form of 
really existing things is no other than the form of consciousness of the thinking, judging and 
experiencing subject. That is to say, 
the form of sensory consciousness as it ﬁgures in sensory apprehension of an object cannot as such bear no 
internal relation to the form of the capacity which we exercise in engaging in acts of thought and judgment 
about that same object. (Conant 2016:85/2017a:241)  9
 See the discussion in Schulting (2018), ch. 10, and Schulting (2017b). Cf. Conant (2016:83): “The Kantian 7
problematic is concerned, in the ﬁrst instance, not with the distinction between truth and falsity, but with 
what it is to stick your neck out in thinking, which Kant calls the objective validity of judgment, with what I 
will sometimes call the objective purport of judgement.”
 Cf. Conant (2017a:238ﬀ.).8
 In the German version Conant renders the underlined phrase more precisely as “[d]ie Form einer Episode des 9
sinnlichen Bewusstseins [...] qua sinnliches Auﬀassens eines Gegenstandes”.
But what Conant claims here is ambiguous between saying that 
(A) the form of an episode of consciousness qua sensible apprehension of an object is not 
unrelated to the form of the capacity to think or judge about that same object 
and 
(A*) the form of an episode of consciousness qua sensible apprehension of an object as an 
object is not unrelated to the form of the capacity to think or judge about that same 
object. 
In (A*), the form of an episode of consciousness is indeed not possible without the form of 
thinking, since the categories ﬁrst enable an objective apprehension of the thing, namely to 
apprehend a thing as an object that I perceive as existing – the “taking as” is a function of 
the capacity to think or judge. But on reading (A), the form of an episode of consciousness 
is not so dependent, for there is no speciﬁcation on this reading of a further constraint that 
goes beyond the fact that an episode of consciousness is apprehended qua sensibly 
apprehending a merely indeterminate object of perception. So technically speaking, reading 
(A) is false, for a mere sensible apprehension of an object is neither identical to, nor 
dependent on, a judging about an object. Much of course here depends on how we are to 
gloss the term “object”. 
 The distinction between a mere sensible apprehension of an (indeterminate) object 
and a sensible apprehension of an object as an object amounts to the distinction between 
concept-free “simple seeing” and conceptually loaded perception respectively, whereby one 
understands perception in the strict sense of objectively valid, veridical perception. “Simply 
seeing” x is like stepping on x, it is not the same as actually perceiving x. Perceiving x 
would involve concepts (including categories) and thus the capacity for the use of them, 
simply seeing x does not. As Quassim Cassam (2007) has argued persuasively (following 
Fred Dretske), not knowing what a cup is prevents one from perceiving a cup but not from 
seeing a cup, more precisely, seeing an undetermined object that is a cup. That Conant, 
however, wants to read the apprehension of an object in the broader sense of (A),  and not 
in terms of (A*), is made clear by his conclusion to Section III: “What is given through the 
senses, simply in virtue of being intuited, already exhibits a form which is not simply other 
than that which the categories prescribe” (Conant 2016:85/2017a:241, emphasis added). In 
other words, it appears that for Conant even simple seeing requires a form prescribed by 
the categories. 
5 Ways of Reading the Goal of the B-Deduction 
One of the problems with getting to grips with Kant’s Transcendental Deduction is 
determining, ﬁrst, what its goal is. This involves establishing the precise relation between 
the Deduction, in particular if we look at the so-called “second step” of the B-Deduction, to 
what has already been shown in the Transcendental Aesthetic (Puzzle 1). And if we look at 
the B-Deduction only, it involves determining the much-discussed relation between the ﬁrst 
and second steps (Puzzle 3). Conant talks about four “choice 
points” (Entscheidungspunkte), that is, central points in the argumentation, where one must 
choose to either make a right or a left turn, which decides on one’s further interpretative 
path through the arguments. 
5.1 A Restrictive or Non-Restrictive View of Subjectivity 
First, with respect to the role of subjectivity, according to Conant one adopts either a 
restrictive or non-restrictive view of subjectivity – this is the ﬁrst “choice-point”. That is, a 
restrictive view of subjectivity sees the conditions of cognition or knowledge as limiting 
conditions or constraints on the possibility of cognition or knowing. But the terminology of 
“restrictive” or “limiting” is misleading. What is at issue in Kant’s account are rather 
constitutive conditions of cognition. Conant quotes Pippin in this regard (Conant 2017a:
243f.),  but he seems to read Pippin’s comments about subjectivity in a psychological 10
sense. Conant says: 
If one begins by understanding Kant’s conception of ﬁnitude to be a restrictive one [as Conant believes 
Pippin just accepts; D.S.], then it is almost impossible to avoid eventually sliding into [...] an impositionist 
reading of the First Critique – a reading according to which the categories of the understanding are taken 
to impose certain forms of unity on an exogenous matter. (Conant 2016:88/2017a:244–5) 
It appears that Conant here reads Pippin as if the latter believed the conditions of 
cognition are limiting in a merely subjective, psychological sense:  they constrain our 11
knowledge merely to what we are able to know, and do not concern the way that objects 
are constituted. But, on Kant’s account, the necessary, subjective conditions of ﬁnite 
experience are of course not psychological conditions. If these conditions are not only 
subjective but also objective conditions as Kant says (A158 / B197) (and Conant himself 
quotes McDowell on this), there cannot be a question of an impositionist reading, because 
the conditions of thought ﬁrst constitute objectivity; so, as Conant himself reasons,  there 12
is nothing that is at ﬁrst only objectively given on which the forms of thought are 
subsequently imposed, exogenously. Conant is of course right to say that a certain use of 
unfortunate terminology (“imposition”, or indeed Kant’s own “Anwendung” or the language 
 In the English version he quotes Guyer (Conant 2016:87).10
 As noted earlier, I myself have argued for a “radically” subjectivist reading of Kant’s account of the 11
necessary conditions or constraints of objective experience, whereby “radical” subjectivism must be 
diﬀerentiated from mere, or psychological, subjectivism. See Schulting (2017a).
 See the two paragraphs ending Section V in the English version of his article (Conant 2016:89), which are 12
not in the German version.
of “addition” in §15 of the B-Deduction)  does suggest such an impositionist reading 13
(2016:88/2017a:245). 
5.2 Two-Stage or Anti-Two-Stage 
The second “choice-point” is probably a decisive one when it comes to refuting the “layer 
cake model”. Conant says that most Anglophone readings espouse the two-stage reading. He 
diﬀerentiates between three versions of the two-stage reading. 
(i) According to the standard reading, there are two temporally separated episodes in 
apperceptive consciousness, that is, 
a ﬁrst apperceptive stage in which a manifold of bare sensory consciousness is constituted, followed by a 
second stage in which it is then synthesized and brought into accord with the unity prescribed by the 
categories of the understanding. (Conant 2016:90/2017a:246) 
Presumably, the ﬁrst “apperceptive stage” is the analytic unity of consciousness or 
apperception, whilst the “second stage” is the synthetic unity of consciousness or 
apperception. But this is, in my view, based on a mistaken, that is, metaphysically 
intemperate and logically confused reading of the principle of transcendental apperception, 
for there just is no such two-stage apperception, and if some commentators hold such a 
view,  they are simply wrong.  Moreover, if it were Kant’s view, there would be a problem 14 15
about regress: how do we get from the ﬁrst to the second stage? Given that we are already 
 But notice that the German original at B131, hinzukommen, does not have the active connotation of 13
“adding” as if some thing or agent must literally tack something on from outside; hinzukommen just points to 
a transcendental-logically required extra element.
 And indeed quite a few commentators hold such a view or a view like it. See e.g. most recently Dyck (2017).14
 I have argued against this reading in Schulting (2017b) and at length in Schulting (2018).15
talking about transcendental apperception as an original, a priori form of consciousness 
more original than which there is none, there could not be a third kind of a priori principle 
of apperception which enables the transition from the ﬁrst to the second stage. I cannot 
discuss apperception here in any detail.  What I can say here is that the analytic and 16
synthetic unities of apperception that Kant formally distinguishes are simultaneous or 
coextensive in all actual cases of cognition of which apperception forms part and parcel, and 
they are reciprocally dependent. The synthetic unity of consciousness is the logical ground 
of analytic unity of consciousness and any synthetic unity of consciousness or apperception 
necessarily entails an analytic unity of consciousness or apperception. Likewise, one cannot 
have an analytic unity of apperception without synthetic unity of apperception. And if there 
is no analytic unity of apperception, there is no transcendental apperception either – you 
might have empirical apperception, but I do not think that is what Conant has in mind, 
since (1) empirical apperception is purely contingent, associative, and subcognitive, and 
there is no teleological power of any sort in empirical apperception which makes it amenable 
to being conditioned, governed or subject to transcendental apperception (cf. B133, A107) 
and (2) he appears to refer to empirical apperception in his second variant reading, which 
we consider next. So this variant (variant 1) of the two-stage reading can simply be 
dismissed, despite the fact that, at least according to Conant (2016:91/2017a:247), this 
appears to be the most widespread version of the two-stage reading. 
(ii) The second variant is equally mistaken. This variant says that the ﬁrst stage is a 
subconscious or sub-apperceptive stage and the second stage is the apperceptive stage, i.e. it 
concerns the not less popular view that the principle of transcendental apperception and 
hence the categories ﬁrst bring the manifold to consciousness. This suggests that everything 
that is not apperceived in the transcendental way is unconscious. By implication, any 
tokening of empirical apperception or consciousness is subject to transcendental 
 See Schulting (2018) and Schulting (forthcoming).16
apperception as a general principle of consciousness. This would entail that any representer 
who is either in principle (animals, infants) or occurrently not in possession of (her) 
apperceptive capacities is eo ipso unconscious (i.e. the intensity of consciousness equals a 
magnitude of 0). This is often thought, but it is an implausible view. And Kant does not 
hold it.  The principle of apperception is not a principle of consciousness; not even Leibniz 17
held the view, though he is often portrayed as if he did, and neither is transcendental 
apperception the necessary principle of empirical apperception simpliciter.  18
(iii) Fortunately, Conant concentrates on the third variant of the two-stage reading. Conant 
thinks that sensibility and thought are two logically but not temporally separable 
components of cognitions. This is the most promising reading, and if modiﬁed, the right 
one. Conant thinks that reading the Aesthetic and the Deduction as separably enabling two 
forms of cognition, namely sensibility or the intuiting of an object, on the one hand, and 
thinking an object, on the other, requires the ﬁrst variant, which says that there are two 
“apperceptive stages”. I do not think it does. For in order to be sensibly aware of an 
indeterminate object in space and time, I do not need transcendental apperception at all, 
and such an episode is nonetheless a form of cognition, or at least a form of sensory 
awareness (see the Stufenleiter distinctions). The indeterminacy implies that the ‘I’ as 
identical subject of perceiving is not involved in the perception. There is just a perception 
(in the sense of “simple seeing”) of some object going on in someone’s mind, for which there 
is no occurrent apperceptive ‘I’ strictly speaking who is aware of the perception as being her 
perception among her other, similar perceptions, and hence of a determinate object (cf. 
Conant 2016:107). The esse and percipi of the perception collapse into one. Conant writes: 
 So I have argued in Schulting (2018) and Schulting (forthcoming). Cf. McLear (2011).17
 For more details, see Schulting (2017a), (2018) and (forthcoming).18
Such a form of sheer sensory awareness is taken, on the standard variant of a two-stage reading, to be what 
is given to us ﬁrst in the process of cognition – where “ﬁrst” means that this stage of cognitive processing 
is taken to be prior in a temporal as well as a logical sense. A proponent of the standard variant will 
generally go on to read the Transcendental Analytic as introducing what is taken to be a further 
requirement on genuinely objectively valid representations of objects – one that comes into play when these 
elements of an episode of sensory consciousness are “brought under” concepts – where this business of 
“bringing things under concepts” is construed as both a temporally and logically posterior stage in the 
cognitive process to mere sensory awareness of the object. (Conant 2016:91/2017a:247) 
Conant is right that some nonconceptualists on Kant can be read in this way, and that they 
are mistaken to read Kant in this way. But I believe Conant is wrong about why they are 
mistaken. That the stages of cognition (intuition of an object and thought of object) are 
indeed not temporally subsequent and thus separate, does not imply that sensible episodes 
of consciousness (sensible apprehensions) are always already combined with a cognitive 
thought or judgement, i.e. that any and all sensible apprehension is always already 
conceptual, or, is a content that is necessarily thought by a judging subject (cf. Conant 
2016:85/2017a:241), or that a sensible manifold is always already uniﬁed in the strong sense 
that Kant means. Conant cites C.I. Lewis and says that “Lewis insists” that “[e]xperience 
always comes to us as unity” (2016:91/2017a:248) and that this unity is the unity of the 
understanding. But this just conﬂicts with §15, in the B-Deduction, where it explicitly says 
that (necessary) unity must be added to the manifold, for it is not contained in it as a 
matter of course. So the manifold of representations in an intuition as such does not come 
to us in a unity. We have to add the unity to it.  We have to be careful though to read this 19
“adding” not in an impositionist way, the way that Conant rightly rejects. 
5.3 The Sense(s) of “Anschauung” 
 For a detailed account, see Schulting (2018), ch. 7.19
For the third “choice-point”, Conant concentrates on the term “Anschauung”, which he says 
can be, and often is, read in two senses, but should in fact not be interpreted thus. He 
reﬂects on one of the most prominent readings of the Deduction by Henry Allison. Allison 
cites British philosopher and Kant scholar W.H. Walsh, who argues that sensible intuition is 
“only ‘proleptically’ the awareness of a particular” (Allison 1983:67).  Allison says – and 20
quite rightly, I think – that we must distinguish between indeterminate or nonconceptual 
and determinate or conceptual intuitions (Allison 1983:67). Conant calls this distinction a 
distinction between two kinds of intuition (2016:95/2017a:250), but that is not entirely 
correct, for while intuitions can become determined, as Allison indeed says, there are no 
ontologically distinct kinds of intuition which have nothing in common. A modal aspect is 
involved here which is ignored by Conant, who focuses on an explanation by way of 
classifying putatively diﬀerent types/kinds of intuition, whereby the indeterminate intuition 
is supposedly the ﬁrst stage of experience (mere sensory awareness or sensation) and 
determinate intuition represents the second stage of fully-ﬂedged experience (Erfahrung in 
Kant’s sense). Conant speaks of the “reshaping” (2016:94/2017a:250) of intuitions, from the 
indeterminate kind to the determinate kind of intuition. To be sure, Conant criticises this 
view. But I believe there is more similarity between a view such as Allison’s that says that 
intuition can become determinate and Conant’s own “transformative” view of intuition or 
sensibility than the latter would have it. 
 To be clear, Conant rejects what could be called the “commentarian” approach, as if 
one had to look at the text with a pen in hand and “begin to introduce a little subscript for 
each occurrence of the term ‘intuition’, clearly indicating which sort of intuition is Kant’s 
topic where” (2016:95/2017a:250f.). This would indeed be a silly practice, but I believe no 
one really believes that we must interpret the term Anschauung diﬀerently at each point 
where it appears in Kant’s text, and accordingly make deﬁnitional distinctions, which are 
then rigorously abided by throughout the text of the Critique – or as Conant puts it: 
 The quote is from Walsh (1975:15).20
Es sieht so aus, als ob die Aufgabe des verantwortungsvollen Kommentators von ihm verlangt, überall 
Unterscheidungen einzuführen, wo Kant dies versäumt hat. (Conant 2017a:251) 
However, I do believe we have to be careful not to think that instead of doing so we can 
blithely disregard the variant contexts in which the term Anschauung appears, without 
noticing if the term “intuition” refers to an appearing object (as opposed to a thing in 
itself) of which I have such and such knowledge or just means an aggregate of 
representations, that is, any arbitrary intuition of something undetermined (cf. B34 / A20). 
Philosophical language is not an exact science (though some would like it to be), so there is 
undoubtedly a need for hermeneutics, whether one likes it or not, also, and I would say 
especially, in the case of Kant’s notoriously elusive text that is the Transcendental 
Deduction.  
 I should like to note though that I share Conant’s general sentiment here because all 
too often Kant commentators, and especially those from the current crop of analytically 
schooled Kantians, show a penchant for ﬁligree classiﬁcation and deﬁnition, which runs the 
risk of slicing up and compartmentalising Kant’s reasoning rather than explaining it.  With 21
such a strategy, which models itself after a formalist conception of philosophy, one often 
fails to see, or plainly misjudges, the bigger picture. However, a sentiment does not an 
argument make. Moreover, contrary to what Conant suggests, Kant himself often 
diﬀerentiates between indeterminate and determinate intuitions or manifolds of 
representations, most explicitly at a crucial juncture in the B-Deduction at B160f., 
 An example of this practice is the ubiquitous reference to the Stufenleiter (A320 / B376f.) and a well-known 21
passage in the Jäsche Logic (Logik 9:33) for an analysis of Kant’s putatively diverse views on cognition and 
representation (see e.g. Lau 2017:124, 126f.) as if an understanding of Kant’s account of cognition could be 
based on parsing the supposedly crystal-clear deﬁnitions Kant provides there and any interpretation of Kant’s 
theory of cognition should be measured against these deﬁnitions (quite apart from the problematic nature of 
the Jäsche Logic as a source of textual evidence).
including its notorious footnote.  And Kant also distinguishes between intuition and the 22
unity thereof (see also e.g. the capitalisation of Einer at B143 and B144f.; this is discussed 
further below). 
 Nevertheless, to take the way the Deduction and the Critique in general is written at 
face value and not to try and rewrite it by trying to foist clear deﬁnitions on it whenever it 
seems that Kant is contradicting himself, is a point well-taken, particularly also because 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy does not work according to the procedure of ﬁrst 
providing clear deﬁnitions and basing its subsequent arguments on them – a fundamental 
point that so-called “analytically oriented” readings of Kant often seem to forget. (I have 
often the impression that Kant scholars approach Kant’s transcendental philosophy as if it 
were a scholastic enterprise such as Wolﬀ’s, with its neat classiﬁcatory schemas and 
analytical deﬁnitions, which only need to be mapped rigorously, “analytically”, in order to 
understand his thought; see further below.) 
 Conant is entirely right to warn against reading the Deduction (or the Critique in 
general) as if it concerned a mathematical treatise, starting with deﬁnitions, on which what 
follows necessarily depends. Rather, as he says, the concepts employed and delineated by 
Kant ﬁnd their complete expression only at the end of a dialectical process of philosophical 
reﬂection, once the task of the Critique has been completed (Conant 2016:96f./2017a:253). 
One should of course be careful not to go to the other extreme of analytical ﬁligree, namely, 
what one could call interpretative globalism, in virtue of which the text is read in conformity 
with a particular broadly deﬁned view one has in mind to which the text must be adapted, 
rather than letting it speak for itself, warts and all (i.e. with its apparent contradictions). 
 But having said that, an Anti-Two-Stage reading, the kind that Conant propagates, 
is not forced on us – nor of course is disagreeing with Conant on this point necessarily proof 
of a Two-Stage reading, the one that Conant rejects. This becomes clear if we focus on his 
analysis of the notion of Anschauung. Conant writes the following: 
 See the account by Onof/Schulting (2015).
[The notion] “intuition” [...] is initially glossed by Kant as “immediate singular representation” [...]. It is 
then shown over a great many pages that the initial gloss is not to be understood as the characterization of 
a self-standingly intelligible form of representation – that its very possibility requires the involvement of a 
capacity whose exercise cannot be restricted to the production of such representations. (2016:97/2017a:
253f.) 
  
Conant subsequently makes it clear that the capacity at issue here is the intellectual 
capacity, which is thus also involved in the production of intuitions. But I do not think this 
can be right: intuition does for its production or possibility not depend on intellectual 
conditions or the participation of the intellectual capacity (cf. B122f.). I do not think that 
Kant argues that the involvement of the understanding is a necessary condition on the very 
possibility of intuitions as such. 
 Conant reasons that either intuition is blind, and so not, in contrast to 
nonconceptualist interpretations of Kant, already referring to an object, or an intuition 
concerns a representation with objective purport that can be speciﬁed only with the help of 
the understanding (2017a:254). But this omits a third possibility, which the 
nonconceptualist position alludes to, namely to specify what it means to have a blind 
intuition. A blind intuition is still immediately related to an object but blindly. A blind 
intuition is not an oxymoron. The Kantian nonconceptualist, at least in one sense of 
nonconceptualism, tries to specify the counterfactual situation in which the conditions 
under which the relation is objectively valid fail to apply, but there still is an intuition of an 
object in some sense.  23
5.4 One or Two Kinds of Unity? 
 I have argued elsewhere (Schulting 2015; 2017a, ch. 5) that most Kantian nonconceptualists however believe 23
that the reference to an object in an intuition, independently of the categories, is already in some way 
objectively valid, and I argued that this reading is mistaken – for Kant, objective validity is a function solely 
of the categories and judgement.
For the fourth “choice-point” Conant points to Kant’s distinction between the subjective 
and objective unities of consciousness, only the latter of which has objective validity, 
according to Kant (B139f.). Conant argues that one should not read Kant as if it were 
possible to pass from a merely (Humean) subjective unity of consciousness, which is only 
subjectively valid, to an objective unity of consciousness by “adding” something to the 
connection of representations that provides them an element of objectivity (Conant 
2016:98/2017a:255). 
 Conant refers to Lewis White Beck’s distinction between L- and K-experience (Beck 
2002), reﬂecting the apparent ambiguity in Kant’s notion of experience (Conant 2016:98f./
2017:255), where L-experience stands for “Lockean experience” and K-experience for 
“Kantian experience”. Lockean experience is equivalent to a merely subjectively valid unity 
of consciousness, whereas K-experience is equivalent to Kant’s objective unity of 
consciousness. According to Beck, the goal of Kant is to change L-experience into K-
experience. I do not think this is what Kant intends or does; while I agree there is a 
diﬀerence between both, the goal is not to change L- into K-experience. L-experience 
reﬂects the de facto givenness of our mental states and how representations are prompted in 
the mind in accordance with the necessary form of inner sense, time; apart from the 
explanation given in the Aesthetic as to the necessary form of inner sense, this givenness of 
states and representations needs as such no further transcendental explanation – L-
experience just is the aggregate of sensations one has in any arbitrary manifold of 
representations in intuition. The real explanandum in Kant’s account in the Deduction is K-
experience; only its conditions are examined, not the conditions of L-experience, nor the 
conditions of the latter being changed into K-experience. In fact, L-experience and K-
experience are not to be seen as two diﬀerent kinds of experience; rather, L-experience is the 
sensory state or states which we would be in, were the conditions necessary for K-experience 
not to be satisﬁed. (And this is not just a hypothetical possibility, it is a real metaphysical 
possibility. See the next section.) 
 This ties in with Conant’s own observation – with reference to A111f. – that L-
experience is not a distinct form of experience, which could exist without the categories. To 
an extent, one could have sensations, sensibly apprehend indeterminate objects without the 
categories (the possibility of which Conant however rejects) but this would indeed not be a 
temporally separable kind of experience in the strict sense; it is just that having sensations 
is something which we must assume for a fact even to be able to talk about K-experience, 
while it is not something that necessarily entails K-experience (or the transcendental 
conditions on K-experience, for that matter). There is no sense in which a temporal 
transitional process from L-experience to K-experience is at issue, and to this extent I 
concur with Conant. 
 Conant also mentions Beck’s reference to the often discussed passage at A90f. / 
B122f., where Kant considers the apparently hypothetical case that our appearances do not 
conform to the functions of thought or the categories. It is a pity that Conant does not 
quote the recent literature on the interpretation of this passage (see Ginsborg 2008; Allison 
2012; Gomes 2014; Golob 2016; Schulting 2015, 2017a). Conant says that there are two 
logically possible options, but that only one is really possible. The possibility of the 
conditions of sensibility not corresponding to the conditions of thinking (the categories) is 
not after all a real possibility, Conant says (cf. Gomes 2014); and he calls this, somewhat 
cheekily, the “Phew! reading” (2016:101/2017a:258) of §13 of the Deduction: 
It is to read Kant as seeking to show that the possibility that is entertained here in §13 [i.e. the passage at 
A90f. / B122f.; D.S.] is to be unmasked as a merely apparent possibility. (Conant 2016:101/2017a:259)  24
 Cf. my discussion in Schulting (2017a), ch. 5, and Schulting (2015).24
Conant points out that the B-Deduction was written precisely to make it as clear as 
possible that “the Transcendental Aesthetic does not present us with a separate and 
independent condition for objects to be given to our senses” (2016:110/2017a:263). This 
seems indeed Kant’s goal if we look at the passage in §21 of the B-Deduction, where he says 
that he is going to examine how things are given in sensibility in the second step of the B-
Deduction. But note that the discussion in the second step consistently concerns objects of 
perception; so the emphasis should lie on objects, not as mere objects of sensible 
apprehension but as determinate objects of which we have experience, about which we make 
judgements and express beliefs.  Signiﬁcantly, Conant points to B143, the transitional 25
section between the ﬁrst and second steps of the B-Deduction: 
Also ist alles Mannigfaltige, so fern es in Einer empirischen Anschauung gegeben ist, in Ansehung einer der 
logischen Funktionen zu urteilen bestimmt, durch die es nämlich zu einem Bewußtsein überhaupt gebracht 
wird. (B143) 
Conant comments: 
This looks to say that in order to meet the conditions on something’s so much as being an intuition it must 
be subject to the categories. So it now looks as if the following idea is to be rejected as well: the idea of 
something’s being subject to the conditions on intuitional unity while not being subject to the conditions 
on categorial unity. (Conant 2016:107/2017a:259) 
As Conant notes – but only in the English version of his text (Conant 2016:107) – unusually 
Kant here capitalises the inﬂected indeﬁnite article Einer. Why? For it concerns a unitary 
intuition, not just the constitution of any arbitrary intuition or its existence condition, and 
this is at variance with Conant’s reading, who seems to think that intuition is always 
already a unitary intuition – in the above quotation “conditions on something’s so much as 
 For textual evidence and how to gloss it, see Schulting (2018), ch. 11.25
being an intuition” is elided into “something’s being subject to the conditions on intuitional 
unity” (second emphasis added). But Kant’s employment of the limiting conjunctive sofern 
indicates this is not the case: it is only to the extent to which the manifold in an empirical 
intuition is united, that the manifold of that intuition stands under the functions of thought 
and is determined in accordance with them, that is, subject to categorial unity. John 
McDowell is right here: “Intuitions just happen, outside the control of their subjects. But 
their unity is intelligible only in the context of apperceptive spontaneity” (2009:72, emphasis 
added). This might though just be taken to mean that the intuition qua its unity is still, as 
intuition, subject to the categories.  And indeed McDowell’s reasoning is in fact similar to 26
Conant’s. McDowell writes the following: 
The B Deduction is framed to avoid a certain objection. Kant wants to establish that experience has its 
objective purport by virtue of being informed by the pure concepts of the understanding. The objection is 
that that ensures only thinkability. But a condition for objects to be thinkable is not thereby a condition 
for them to be capable of being given to our senses [...] Kant organizes the B Deduction so as to forestall 
this objection. The essential move is to deny that the Transcendental Aesthetic oﬀers an independent 
condition for objects to be given to our senses. [...] The unity constituted by conformity to the requirements 
of our sensibility, which is the unity of the pure formal intuitions of space and time, is not a separate 
unity, independent of the unity that consists in being informed by the categories. (McDowell 2009:73f., 
emphasis added) 
In a more recent essay, McDowell argues: 
In the second part of the Deduction [...] Kant needs to exclude this apparent possibility of presence to my 
senses that, because it does not conform to the requirement of synthetic unity, does not count as presence 
to me. He needs to show that synthetic unity is already a condition for presence to my senses, not a merely 
additional condition for what (illicitly on this view) I count as presence of objects to me. (McDowell 
2017:317, emphasis added) 
 Cf. Land (2014) and my discussion of Land in Schulting (2018), ch.11.26
McDowell reasons that “cases of sensory consciousness [...] are describable as presence of 
objects to subjects” (2017:317), which as such entails the involvement of categorial unity; 
“presence to our senses without categorial unity” would not be “presence to us”, or 
“presence of objects in a demanding sense” (2017:317). Like Conant, McDowell argues that 
the second step of the B-Deduction excludes the possibility of mere “presence to our senses 
without categorial unity”, presumably because he thinks that “presence to our senses” eo 
ipso entails categorial unity in virtue of its describability alone. But too much metaphysical 
weight is put on the sense of the possessive pronoun “our” if it is read in the strict sense, as 
McDowell seems to do, namely, as already entailing the subjective agent’s identity that is 
ﬁrst introduced by the categories. But this is question-begging: the sensing subject is not 
ipso facto a thinking subject, reﬂectively aware of himself as sensing. 
 Analogously, Conant writes that “[t]he second half of the B Deduction aims to show 
that the formedness of our sensibility, treated in the Aesthetic, cannot be in view fully 
independently of the form of apperceptive spontaneity, treated in the 
Analytic” (2016:112/2017a:264, emphasis added). The emphasised phrase adds some 
ambiguity to Conant’s statement. Does he mean that the form of sensibility cannot be 
examined separably by the apperceiving agent of cognition – or, by the philosopher who 
carries out or reﬂects on the analysis of the Deduction – or does he mean that the form of 
sensibility (i.e. its unity) is no other than the form of apperceptive spontaneity? Only the 
second option refutes the two-stage-model. But the fact that the philosopher who analyses 
the possibility of “presence to the senses” himself must be able to describe this in virtue of 
his (the philosopher’s) capacity to apply categories does of course not imply that the 
sensible subject to whose senses something is presented – the object of the philosophical 
description – must be able to describe this presence to himself (the sensible subject) in 
virtue of the capacity of a thinking subject. Conant says: 
So the crucial step involves showing that the unity constituted by conformity to the requirements of our 
form of sensibility, which is the unity of the pure formal intuitions of space and time, is not an utterly 
separate form of unity of manifold – one that could be in place altogether independently of the sort of 
unity of manifold that consists in our perceptual experience’s being informed by the categories. (Conant 
2016:123f.n.54/2017a:264f.n.26) 
McDowell says likewise: 
Synthetic unity is presupposed already in the requirement of spatial and temporal order that ﬁrst came 
into view, in the Aesthetic, as required by our sensibility. There is only one unity, the synthetic unity that 
is intelligible only in terms of the unifying power of the spontaneous intellect. And the apparent possibility 
of presence to the senses that is not presence to the understanding is unmasked as the mere appearance of 
a possibility. (McDowell 2017:318) 
According to Conant and McDowell, the unity of sensibility, the unity of the pure formal 
intuitions of space and time, is thus no other than the unity that is prescribed by the 
categories. To be sure, Conant rejects a reductive reading, i.e. the reading that says that 
intuitional unity is just a conceptual unity, but other than rejecting a reductive reading he 
does not clarify wherein the correspondence between intuitional and conceptual unity does 
consist. 
 Of course, it is not at issue in the Deduction whether the unity of intuition is 
reducible to a conceptual unity or isolatable or a completely self-standing unity let alone 
“completely identical” to a conceptual unity; no serious conceptualist reading of the 
Deduction would claim that.  But the suggestion that the correspondence is not a complete 27
identity is non-explanatory. One must be able to explain wherein this correspondence 
consists and this implies an understanding of the extent and modality of the involvement of 
apperception in the constitution of this correspondence, which at the same time explains 
the dependence, and the extent of this dependence, of the unity of intuition (space and 
 See Onof/Schulting (2015) for more detail.27
time) on the unity of the understanding. It is not very helpful saying that the same unity of 
the understanding is the unity of sensibility without the latter being reducible to the former 
(which is trivially true), without thereby indicating how the shared original synthetic unity 
comes about. This unity is not simply given in sensibility, and so is not to be identiﬁed with 
the given unity of space (and time), but due to an act of the understanding, which in some 
sense needs to be added (cf. §15) to the manifold since it, being a necessary unity, is not 
contained in the manifold as such.  This unity or combination comes about through an act 28
of the self (apperception) who takes the particular manifold before her as uniﬁed, namely as 
her combined manifold, a manifold that is something to her. This is the subjectivism that I 
would argue is necessarily involved in establishing the unity of sensibility in the sense of a 
necessary synthetic unity in virtue of an original act of synthesis by the understanding, 
which produces spatiotemporally bounded objects. 
 It is not a case of literally – and this is what Conant rightly dismisses as a possible 
reading of Kant – a posteriori imposing (in time) a unity on a pre-given (in time) matter or 
manifold. This cannot be the case since the self-activity of the understanding unifying the 
manifold is an a priori act. The unifying act is a priori because (1) it is required for any 
manifold to be a determinate, objectively valid representation, and (2) if it were not a 
priori, but an a posteriori “imposition”, it would be diﬀicult to fathom how the sensible 
manifold and the act of synthesis by the understanding were in fact necessarily connected 
(this hangs, of course, on Kant’s identiﬁcation of “necessary” and “a priori” [B4]). A 
necessary connection cannot be established or determined by just successively apprehending 
manifolds of representations or looking at how such manifolds are more or less randomly 
aggregated in the mind. 
 Onof/Schulting (2015) distinguish between the unity that the understanding prescribes to the manifold in a 28
spatial intuition for the latter to be a determinate intuition of a spatial object and the unicity of space itself, 
which is not a function of the intellectual unity that the understanding prescribes. The unity of determinate 
spatial wholes and the sui generis unicity of space as such (and the same holds mutatis mutandis for time) are 
irreducible and should not be conﬂated.
 Reason (2) points to regress problems, which I have frequently indicated in my own 
papers dealing with nonconceptualism (Schulting 2010; 2015; 2017a, ch. 5). The regress 
issue is the following: given that a priori synthesis is an original combinatory activity that 
connects two diﬀerent kinds of cognition, sensibility and understanding, at the fundamental 
level at least in one sense, namely, with respect to their shared unitary character, if a priori 
synthesis, as a unifying act of the understanding – as Kant claims it is (§15) – were an 
“additional” imposition on a “pre-given” manifold, then the question arises as to how the 
supposedly imposed synthetic unity itself is a priori synthesised with the pre-given 
manifold. This would putatively be established in virtue of an a priori synthesis*, namely 
the kind of a priori synthesis that connects a priori synthesis with a sensible manifold. But 
then the question would arise as to how a priori synthesis and a priori synthesis* are a 
priori synthesised. Would it be an a priori synthesis** that a priori synthesises both a 
priori synthesis and a priori synthesis*? 
 It is easy to see that this is going nowhere and makes a mockery of the notion of “a 
priori”: a priori synthesis was precisely designed by Kant to avoid these kinds of regress, i.e. 
it should serve as a regress blocker. A priori synthesis is a synthesis, carried out by the 
thinking self (the understanding), more original or more fundamental than which there is 
none (on Kant’s account, at least). There is just one kind of original or a priori synthesis, 
and it is the one that binds sensibility and understanding at the fundamental level, insofar 
as their shared necessary unitary character is concerned, namely the unity that is necessary 
for possible knowledge. The “insofar as” clause indicates that sensibility and understanding 
are irreducible: there is still a sense in which sensibility is independent of the understanding, 
namely insofar as there is a real possibility that there is no occurrent subject of 
understanding, a judging subject, that actively takes a sensible manifold as together 
constituting a uniﬁed intuition that is a condition on possible knowledge. 
 This does not mean that to deny, on my reading, McDowell’s rejection of the real 
possibility of “rogue appearances” (2017:318f.) means to claim that “there may be more to 
a reality that is empirical, in that it impinges on our senses, than what we can 
judge” (2017:319). What we can judge is all that there possibly is about empirical reality, 
which sensibly aﬀects us; there is no in principle gap between what we can judge and what 
there is in empirical terms. To deny rejecting the real possibility of what McDowell terms 
“rogue appearances” just means to deny that any presence (of appearances) to the senses 
must be a presence to the understanding (and judging) subject because otherwise, as 
McDowell says, “we would not even be entitled to the idea of presence to the 
senses” (2017:319), for the ground that McDowell gives here confuses the empirical level 
with the transcendental level of explanation: there is no requirement for presence to the 
senses to be a real possibility that some thinking agent entertains the idea of presence to 
the senses and applies it in her own case. An object may be sensibly present without a 
subject recognising it as such. 
6 Two Kinds of Synthesis? On How to Read the Leitfaden Passage (A79) 
Conant’s own portrayal of a priori synthesis is somewhat less felicitous, as it seems to ignore 
the active aspect of the original synthetic unity and thus to underplay the identity of the a 
priori synthesis as being a subjective “action” or “function” in virtue of transcendental 
apperception (A108) that binds the unity of intuition and the unity of the understanding. 
He also seems to be talking about two distinct kinds of such synthesis, which to me seems 
at least misleading, and potentially problematic for the same reason that I gave above with 
respect to regress issues. Conant writes with reference to the Leitfaden at A79 / B104f.:  29
This form of unity – categorial unity – characterizes both the manner in which objects are given to us in 
intuition and the manner in which concepts are combined in judgments. To say it can be in act in these 
 I wrote earlier on the guiding thread passage at A79 / B104f. in Schulting (2017a:108f., 203ﬀ., et passim), 29
speciﬁcally in the context of my account of McDowell’s reading of it (2017a:203ﬀ.), and more in detail in 
Schulting (2018), ch. 5. My account below should be seen as an elaboration on that earlier account.
two diﬀerent ways is not to claim that the two sorts of synthesis in no way diﬀer from each other [in the 
German version, the last clause reads: “die beiden hier thematisierte Formen der Synthesis bloß zu 
identiﬁzieren”; D.S.]. (Conant 2016:114/2017a:266) 
But this begs the question as to the extent to which both forms of synthesis that Conant 
refers to, which unite intuitions and concepts respectively, are non-identical and whether 
this view does not conﬂict with Kant’s claim that it is the same function (of the 
understanding, i.e. the function of synthesis) that operates on both levels, namely on the 
level of intuition and concepts. It seems to me that Conant underplays the identity of the 
act of synthesis that ﬁrst constitutes the ‘categorial unity’ on both levels. He writes further: 
Hier liegt eine Form der Einheit vor, die auf zwei unterschiedliche Weisen auftauchen kann.  I take this to 30
be the point of the following famous passage: “The same function which gives unity to the various 
representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an 
intuition” (A79 / B104–5). This “function” grasped in its most abstract form is the original synthetic unity 
of apperception. This is Kant’s most abstract characterization of the unity of the understanding. [...] A 
synthesis of concepts in a judgment is one way of making this highest form of unity more determinate in 
cognition; a synthesis of a manifold into an intuition is another way of making this highest form of unity 
more determinate in cognition – both presuppose the involvement of the understanding. (Conant 
2016:114/2017a:266, emphasis added) 
The last sentence is important, but Conant does not explain how it is possible that one 
function – the understanding – enables two diﬀerent ways in which unity is brought about 
both in the concepts and in the manifold of intuition of a particular judgement S is P. It 
looks like he has merely moved the dualism between sensibility and the understanding to a 
diﬀerent level. That is to say, now it seemingly concerns a dualism between one kind of 
synthetic unity and another kind of synthetic unity, between synthesis of concepts and 
 The parallel passage in the English version is at 2016:114 (“It is merely to claim that there is a level of 30
description of form at which they have something generically in common”), but I ﬁnd the German rendering 
clearer since it includes a reference to unity, which is crucial in the discussion at hand.
synthesis of sensible manifolds in intuitions. But there are no two kinds of synthesis; rather, 
there is just one synthesis in virtue of one original act of a priori synthesis in a judgement, 
and so one kind of function of synthetic a priori unity which as such unites both concepts, 
by means of analytic unity (concepts are only analytically united among each other), and 
empirical intuitions, by means of synthetic unity. (See the second sentence in the Leitfaden 
passage at A79.) 
 Importantly, the original synthesis does not create two synthetic unities on two 
separate or separable levels. It creates one synthetic a priori unity, which holds two diﬀerent 
kinds of representations in a judgement together: namely a unity between concepts (F and 
G, say), on the one hand, and the manifold of representations in an empirical intuition of 
some x, on the other. There is no synthetic unity on the conceptual level as such, in 
abstraction from the connection to the manifold in the intuition. The analytical unity 
among concepts, which, in its most basic form, is always a relation of subordination or a 
relation of genus and species, is rather grounded on a synthetic unity in the content of 
representations, whether they be intuitions or further concepts – this synthetic unity 
enables the combination of two diﬀerent concepts F and G. This is so even if the 
combination merely amounts to an identity relation of sorts between F and G, whereby 
reference to the content of an underlying intuition is otiose, such as in analytic judgements, 
for example the relation between the concepts <bachelor> and <unmarried> in the 
judgement “a bachelor is an unmarried man”. These are not the same concept, clearly, but 
their relation in the analytic judgement “a bachelor is an unmarried man” is based on the 
knowledge that there is an equivalence between the use of the two concepts <bachelor> and 
<unmarried>. Their similar use under similar conditions indicates that a priori synthesis or 
an original synthetic unity is necessarily involved in being able to make the true judgement 
that “a bachelor is an unmarried man”, but no reference to the intuition of an actual 
bachelor is required, and nor is the identity relation between the concepts as such strictly 
speaking a synthetic unity (in the sense that Kant means); rather, that relation is purely 
analytic. The a priori synthetic unity between concepts is due solely to, and only consists 
in, the act of synthesising them as belonging together in this judgement. 
 Of course, that does not mean that all conceptual relations are analytic judgements; 
it just means that all conceptual relations, no matter what, exhibit merely as such an 
analytic unity, which is made possible, implicitly, by a synthetic or combinatory act of 
understanding that establishes that they belong to each other in some speciﬁc sense – 
whether they form synthetic or analytic judgements. Syntactically, any judgement, whether 
analytic or synthetic, might be said to show a kind of synthesis of concepts, namely in the 
way that a concept F is combined with a concept G, or how two or more judgements are 
combined to form a disjunctive judgement, say. But this is of course not the a priori 
synthesis Kant talks about. There is nothing a priori synthetic about how a judgement looks 
on the surface. (Hence, Kant says at B140f. that purely looking at the conceptual relation 
in a judgement does not explain what a judgement is.)  31
 The point is not to deny two distinct/diﬀerentiatable kinds of unity but to explain 
how and, crucially, to what extent the two kinds of unity share a common characteristic, 
namely the original synthetic unity of apperception that is at issue in the Deduction, 
speciﬁcally in the Leitfaden passage at A79. Nor can there be a case – and I suspect that 
Conant believes this, given his emphasising the diﬀerentiation of two kinds of synthesis on 
two levels – of the distinction between ﬁgurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis that 
Kant makes at B151 as supposedly mapping one-to-one on the distinction between the 
intuitional and conceptual levels respectively. Often the intellectual synthesis is identiﬁed as 
having to do with how mere concepts are bound together. But this is misleading. 
Intellectual synthesis is the synthesis of the content of any manifold of representations in 
abstraction from the spatiotemporal nature of that manifold. So intellectual synthesis, as 
much as ﬁgurative synthesis, ﬁgures below the line in an objectively valid synthetic 
 “I have never been able to satisfy myself with the explanation that the logicians give of a judgement in 31
general: it is, they say, the representation of a relation between two concepts. [...] it is not here determined 
wherein this relation consists” (B140f.). 
judgement S is P, whereby the line is the imaginary division between the conceptual level 
(‘S’ and ‘P’) and the level of intuition(s) underlying the subject term of a judgement S is P. 
Intellectual synthesis concerns the analytic unity of concepts, as the conceptual form, and 
the conceptual content of the judgement, the latter being the empirical predicates that it 
consists of, which are just as much part of the manifold in intuition. Conant seems to 
espouse a diﬀerent view: 
[S]ince the categories inform the exercise of our sensory as well as our judgmental capacities, this requires 
that we view both a synthesis of a manifold into intuition and a synthesis of concepts into a judgment as 
not only involving at some level of abstraction the same form, but as involving at any level of speciﬁcation 
a fully and determinately identical form – so that the form of perceptual experience must be in all respects 
identical to the form of judgment. [...] [A] move that appears to license the conclusion that the form of our 
sensory consciousness as such for Kant is always already judgmental in character. (Conant 2016:115/2017a:
267, emphasis added) 
The way Conant puts this is at least misleading: Kant does not say that there is a synthesis 
of concepts into a judgement. It is rather the one act of synthesis (the function of the 
understanding) which unites concepts, “by means of analytic unity”, and also unites the 
bloßen Synthesis in intuition (B105),  “by means of synthetic unity”. There is no synthetic 32
unity of concepts “above the line” (cf. McDowell 2009:5). Concepts are as such strictly 
speaking merely analytically united, as I argued above and just as Kant says in the 
Leitfaden that the understanding “in Begriﬀen, vermittelst der analytischen Einheit, die 
logische Form des Urteils zu Stande brachte” (A79 / B105, emphasis added). The phrase 
“vermittelst der analytischen Einheit” is signiﬁcant. The logical form of a judgement is just 
expressive of the surface grammar of how concepts are related as species and genus; of 
course, they are syntactically bound together, but this is not the a priori synthetic unity 
that Kant means as being the transcendental ground of a judgement as a whole, i.e. both its 
 Kant means by this the empirical synthesis of representations in a sensible (spatiotemporal) manifold.32
logical form and its intuitional or, more precisely, transcendental (i.e. pure intuitional) 
content (cf. beginning of §13), or indeed conceptual content.  33
 Contrary to what Conant seems to suggest, it is not as if the a priori synthesis – 
which is what is meant by the “same function” of the understanding – created a synthetic 
unity above as well as below the line, where above the line is the conceptual space or form, 
which is shown by the syntactical structure of a judgement S is P, and below the line is the 
intuition of some x, of which is predicated S and (through S) P. Rather, the a priori 
synthesis that is the set of the logical functions of the understanding creates the form of a 
categorical judgement (as the basic form of any of the 11 other generic types of judgement), 
which happens by means of analytically subordinating concepts (S under P), whilst thereby 
synthetically (“by means of synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition”) combining the 
content of such a judgement, i.e. representing whatever is intuitionally represented under S 
as also represented under P (regardless whether the intuition is spatiotemporal or not). 
 So, the relation purely between the concepts <cup> and <chipped> in the synthetic 
judgement “This cup is chipped”, say, is analytic – as any mere relation of concepts is – 
namely purely qua logical form in which concepts are syntactically bound in the categorical 
judgement, as subject and predicate. The concept <cup> is placed within the extension of 
the concept <chipped>; that is, the thing of which is predicated <cup> belongs to the 
domain of all possible objects of which <chipped> is predicable, whereby, if we abstract 
from the relation to the thing judged about, the relation purely between the concepts 
<cup> and <chipped> is and remains analytic. 
 Again, this does not mean that the judgement is analytic, as “This cup is chipped” is 
obviously not an analytic judgement. (Klaus Reich [1986] long ago pointed out that it is a 
mistake to think that the distinction between analytic unity and synthetic unity that Kant 
makes in the Leitfaden maps onto the distinction between analytic and synthetic 
 The conceptual content of a judgement are the particular concepts that form a judgement (synthetic or 33
analytic), that is, its empirical content qua empirical concepts.
judgements.) An analytic judgement can be understood purely by looking at the formal 
relation between the concepts, i.e. their analytic unity; one can ignore the transcendental 
ground of this relation, for the reference to an underlying object (x) is otiose for the insight 
in this formal relation (cf. B133f. note). However, for any non-analytic, that is, synthetic, 
judgement, one needs to look beyond the formal, analytical, relation between concepts. Here 
is where the a priori synthesis comes in most crucially,  for the a priori synthesis makes it 34
possible to understand how concepts have an objectively valid reference to an intuited 
object of experience outside the conceptual context; if concepts fail to have relation to an 
object of experience, and cannot be suﬀiciently explained via conceptual analysis otherwise, 
they lack objective validity, and though internally consistent are thus speculative at best.  
 The moral of this story is that the purely conceptual relation between concepts 
considered as such is not a synthetic unity, though it is grounded on an a priori synthesis. 
This goes against the view, espoused by Conant and others, that the synthesis of the 
understanding creates two kinds of synthesis on both the conceptual and intuitional levels – 
whereby intellectual synthesis is supposed to account for the relation of concepts (above the 
line) and ﬁgurative synthesis for the relation of representations in an intuition (below the 
line). In my view, as I hope I have shown, it doesn’t.  There is just one kind of a priori 35
synthesis that unites representations on both the conceptual and intuitional levels uniquely 
by means of analytic unity and uniquely by means of synthetic unity respectively. 
7 Concluding Remarks 
 This is not to say that a priori synthesis has no role in the grounding of analytic judgement (see again 34
earlier above) or the principles of sheer logic. Even the possibility of general logic is based on a priori synthesis 
(see Schulting, ms.).
 For more details about the relation between intellectual and ﬁgurative synthesis, see Schulting (2018), chs 5 35
and 11.
Conant’s reading of the B-Deduction argument assumes a modally absolute construal of the 
relation between sensibility and understanding, whereby no sensible episode is not informed 
by the understanding – or at least by one kind of synthesis, as Conant suggests. But this 
reading is not forced upon us, and as I have tried to explain above, I believe it is the wrong 
reading. Rather, on the subjectivist reading sensibility and understanding are a priori linked 
in virtue of an original synthetic of apperception if and only if the understanding takes 
them to be so linked, and this happens in judgements only. That means that sensibility 
itself is not propositional or conceptually laden or informed, nor that the understanding is 
involved in the production of intuitions per se; sensible content or an intuition is 
conceptually laden, so to speak, only to the extent that it forms the content of an empirical 
judgement about a spatiotemporal object that I perceive as bounded in space etc. The 
argument in the Deduction concerns an analysis of the possibility of knowledge in terms of 
possible judgements, given the fact of such knowledge. This reading commits one to a 
moderately conceptualist take on the relation between sensibility and the understanding, 
insofar as only the two together, in a judgement, constitute cognition or knowledge, and it 
suggests a residual nonconceptualism about intuitions, for intuitions are never as such, 
independently of how the understanding apprehends its relation to intuitions, conceptually 
informed. 
 On this reading, however, the understanding does still determine sensibility inwardly, 
to use a Pippinian phrase, so my reading is a “conceptualist” reading, namely insofar as the 
categories as pure concepts are the necessary ways in which such determination takes place. 
This way, one avoids the conundrum of Conant’s transformative reading, namely how to 
combine a rejection of empiricist dualism whilst not succumbing to a rationalist conceptual 
reductionism. For sensibility is conceptually or categorially determined or informed only 
insofar as the epistemic agent, the subject of understanding, takes it to be so determined. 
The added beneﬁt of this subjectivist reading is that the passages in the text which, to 
nonconceptualists, seem to point to Kant’s nonconceptualism can indeed be read as 
supporting some minimal form of nonconceptualism with respect to the independence of 
intuitions per se considerata but at the same time as wholly compatible with a mainstream 
conceptualist reading of the dialectic of Kant’s chief argument in the Deduction. 
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